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COVID-19 AND THE PERILS OF FREE-MARKET
PARENTING: WHY IT IS PAST TIME FOR THE
UNITED STATES TO INSTALL GOVERNMENT
SUPPORTS FOR FAMILIES
Maxine Eichner*
U.S. public policy has for decades rested on the expectation that parents
will privately provide the cash and conditions their children need. This
expectation is exceptional: most other wealthy countries’ public policies
support children through a mix of public and private funds. The COVID-19
pandemic, however, radically changed U.S. policy. The severe economic
dislocation that resulted led Congress to pass a series of measures that
funneled trillions of public dollars to families and parents. Whether these
measures should represent a temporary deviation from the nation’s
free-market expectations during an unprecedented emergency or the first
step in a long-term shift toward routine public funding for children remains
an open question.
This Essay makes the urgent case for the United States to join other
countries in permanently shifting its approach toward one that combines
private support of children with generous public support. It argues that
“free-market family policy” failed to adequately support American children
long before the pandemic.
Supplementing private funding with a generous stream of public funding
is necessary to support the well-being of U.S. children even after the
pandemic’s economic effects recede.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has long been an outlier among wealthy countries when
it comes to children’s material support.1 Other wealthy democracies treat
government as an integral partner in ensuring that parents get the cash that
allows children the goods and services they need to thrive.2 In contrast, the
United States expects parents to meet children’s needs largely alone, through
market earnings.3
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the glaring weaknesses in the U.S.
system of private support for families. In 2020, almost half of U.S. families
reported a significant drop in income as a result of the pandemic; households
with children were disproportionately affected.4 The economic dislocation
meant that one in five children—and almost one in four Black and Hispanic
children—lived in families that fell below the U.S. poverty line.5
Female-headed households were disproportionately impacted, as the closure
of schools and daycares meant that millions of mothers were forced to take
unpaid time off or leave their jobs entirely to care for children.6
The clear failures of the United States’s “free-market family” approach
during the crisis resulted in a seismic—albeit temporary—shift away from
the expectation that children should sink or swim based on their parents’

1. See generally MAXINE EICHNER, THE FREE-MARKET FAMILY: HOW THE MARKET
CRUSHED THE AMERICAN DREAM (AND HOW IT CAN BE RESTORED) ch. 2 (2020).
2. See generally id.
3. See generally id.
4. See Kim Parker et al., About Half of Lower-Income Americans Report Household Job
or Wage Loss Due to COVID-19, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/04/21/about-half-of-lower-incomeamericans-report-household-job-or-wage-loss-due-to-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/56TLY7BA].
5. Melissa Jenco, Study: COVID-19 Pandemic Exacerbated Hardships for Low-Income,
Minority Families, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS (June 3, 2020), https://publications.aap.org/
aapnews/news/pdfDownload/13838 [https://perma.cc/2JW6-R5NP].
6. See Sarah Jane Glynn, Millions of Families Are Struggling to Address Child Care
Disruptions, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 22, 2021), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/women/news/2021/06/22/500847/millions-families-struggling-address-child-caredisruptions/ [https://perma.cc/BT3L-LXD9]; Heather Long, ‘The Pay Is Absolute Crap’:
Child-Care Workers Are Quitting Rapidly, a Red Flag for the Economy, WASH. POST
(Sept. 19, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/09/19/childcareworkers-quit/ [https://perma.cc/8PFX-5LWS].
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market earnings.7 In response to the economic fallout, Congress took a series
of extraordinary measures to get public cash into the hands of American
families: It provided a weekly federal supplement to state unemployment
benefits for workers who lost their jobs,8 issued three pandemic relief checks
to adults and children,9 and appropriated billions of dollars in emergency aid
to help renters facing eviction.10 And, as the pandemic continued, Congress
approved monthly checks to most families with children for the first time in
the nation’s history.11
However, Congress framed all these actions as temporary measures to
allow families to weather the pandemic.12 The question that remains is
whether measures like these should open the door to more permanent changes
in the nation’s public policy. The Biden administration and many
congressional Democrats have proposed public supports for children going
forward, including continued child-benefit checks, but as this Essay goes to
press, the fate of the Build Back Better bill containing these supports is
stalled in Congress.13

7. I develop the contrasts between what I call the “free-market family policy” of the
United States and the “pro-family policy” of other wealthy democracies in more detail in my
recent book, The Free-Market Family: How the Market Crushed the American Dream (and
How It Can Be Restored). EICHNER, supra note 1. For another critique of the market’s ability
to support families, see generally Meredith J. Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, 2015 UTAH
L. REV. 659.
8. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
§ 2104, 134 Stat. 281, 318 (2020) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 9023).
9. See id. § 2201 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6428); COVID-related Tax Relief
Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 272, 134 Stat. 1182, 1965 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 6428A); American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9601, 135 Stat. 4, 138
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6428B).
10. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, div. N, tit. V(A), § 501,
134 Stat. 1949, 2069–78 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 9058a); American Rescue Plan
Act of 2021 §§ 3201–3202, 135 Stat. at 54–60 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 9058c and
42 U.S.C. § 1437f note).
11. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 §§ 9611–9622, 135 Stat. at 144–53 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
12. The pandemic relief checks were characterized as one-time cash payments. See
generally CARES Act; COVID-related Tax Relief Act of 2020; Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2021; American Rescue Plan Act of 2021. Federal unemployment benefits ended in all
states on September 6, 2021. See SUZAN G. LEVIN, EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM LETTER NO. 15-20, CHANGE 4, at § 3(a)
(2021), https://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/UIPL/UIPL_15-20_Change_4.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2R3V-XVGD]. The child-benefit checks expired at the end of 2021. See American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021 §§ 9611–9622, 135 Stat. at 144–53; Ben Casselman, Child Tax
Credit’s Extra Help Ends, Just as Covid Surges Anew, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/02/business/economy/child-tax-credit.html
[https://perma.cc/H7DP-WMGP]. Pandemic rental assistance will expire either on September
30, 2022 (for funds authorized by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021) or on
September 30, 2025 (for funds authorized by the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021). See
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 § 501(e)(1), as extended by the American Rescue Plan
Act of 2021 § 3201(h); American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 § 3201(g).
13. On November 19, 2021, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a version of the
Build Back Better Act., H.R. 5376, 117th Cong. (2021). As this Essay goes to press, however,
the Act has not passed the U.S. Senate.
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This Essay argues that the answer to the question of whether the United
States should permanently change its approach to family support should be
an emphatic “yes.” The extraordinary policy measures taken to support U.S.
families during the pandemic should become the first steps toward routine
public funding for families. Part I of this Essay describes the measures that
Congress took during the pandemic to support U.S. families. Part II situates
these extraordinary steps in context with the United States’ long-standing
free-market family policy, which expects families to support themselves
almost exclusively through market earnings. Part III demonstrates that, long
before the pandemic, the rise of economic inequality and insecurity made it
increasingly tough for U.S. families to provide the support their children
needed under free-market family policy. Finally, Part IV argues that the
continuation of public funding is necessary to support the well-being of
children after the pandemic’s economic effects recede.
I. PANDEMIC RELIEF MEASURES AND U.S. FAMILIES
The COVID-19 pandemic created economic dislocations that resulted in
unprecedented hardships for U.S. families. The private stream of income
Americans necessarily rely on to support their families ran dry for many, as
many stores, restaurants, and other service establishments shuttered their
doors, and warehouses and offices closed or cut back hours. Between
February and April 2020, the unemployment rate rose from 3.5 percent to
14.7 percent, and the employment-to-population ratio fell from 61.1 percent
to 51.3 percent.14 In April 2020, roughly three in ten adults (28 percent) said
they or someone in their household was laid off or lost their job due to the
outbreak.15 When workers who either had their pay cut because their work
hours were reduced or had to leave work to take care of children are factored
in, four in ten U.S. adults reported their households suffered an income
shock.16 Households with children were disproportionately affected.17 All
14. See William G. Gale & Grace Enda, Economic Relief and Stimulus: Good Progress
but More Work to Do, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/economic-relief-and-stimulus-good-progress-but-more-work-to-do/
[https://perma.cc/Y62X-QYM3].
15. See Kim Parker et al., About Half of Lower-Income Americans Report Household Job
or Wage Loss Due to COVID-19, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/04/21/about-half-of-lower-incomeamericans-report-household-job-or-wage-loss-due-to-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/HC8HE8JK].
16. See id.; see also LAUREN BAUER ET AL., THE HAMILTON PROJECT, BROOKINGS INST.,
TEN FACTS ABOUT COVID-19 AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 14 (2020), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FutureShutdowns_Facts_LO_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H5BX-4WW4].
17. See generally BETSEY STEVENSON, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, BROOKINGS INST., THE
INITIAL IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES ACROSS GROUPS AND THE
POTENTIAL FOR PERMANENT SCARRING (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/Stevenson_LO_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT3A-A69M]; Nicole
Bateman & Martha Ross, Why Has COVID-19 Been Especially Harmful for Working
Women?, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/essay/why-has-covid-19been-especially-harmful-for-working-women/ [https://perma.cc/NM4F-69CD].
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told, upward of three out of five low-income households with children,
disproportionately from nonwhite households, reported that they experienced
an income shock from the pandemic.18
Under U.S. free-market family policy, these income shocks translated into
real hardship for U.S. children at the most basic level. A Brookings
Institution study found that economic dislocation due to the pandemic in late
June 2020 meant that 13.9 million children (18 percent of all children in the
United States) were not getting enough to eat because their families simply
could not afford to pay for food.19 This number was almost six times the
number of children who were food insecure in all of 2018.20 And this was
the number of families in which children did not get enough to eat. One in
four U.S. households with children reported that the household lacked
adequate food in June 2020.21 Children of color were disproportionately
affected, experiencing food hardship at three times the rate of white
children.22 That few children were going to school—where they could have
received free or reduced-price lunches—added to the gravity of the
problem.23 These income shocks also meant that parents could not afford
rent: in early September 2021, almost one in four renters (23 percent) living
with children reported that they were behind on rent.24 Such economic
distress has long been known not only to affect children materially but also
to undermine parents’ mental health and emotional bandwidth, thus
undermining the quality of their parenting;25 preliminary research suggests
that the pandemic was no exception.26
Faced with the economic disruption caused by COVID-19, Congress
passed extraordinary measures to get cash into the hands of U.S. families. It
supplemented states’ unemployment benefits for workers who had lost jobs
18. See BAUER ET AL., supra note 16, at 13.
19. See Lauren Bauer, About 14 Million Children in the US Are Not Getting Enough to
Eat, BROOKINGS INST. (July 9, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/09/
about-14-million-children-in-the-us-are-not-getting-enough-to-eat/ [https://perma.cc/8Q6BTMPU].
20. See id.
21. See id. The rate of food-insecure households is higher than the rate of households
with food-insecure children because adults usually scrimp to ensure that children eat first. See
Brynne Keith-Jennings et al., Number of Families Struggling to Afford Food Rose Steeply in
Pandemic and Remains High, Especially Among Children and Households of Color, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.cbpp.org/research/foodassistance/number-of-families-struggling-to-afford-food-rose-steeply-in-pandemic-and
[https://perma.cc/2FFJ-GZ8B].
22. See Keith-Jennings, supra note 21.
23. See id.
24. See Tracking the COVID-19 Economy’s Effects on Food, Housing, and Employment
Hardships, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.cbpp.org/
research/poverty-and-inequality/tracking-the-covid-19-economys-effects-on-food-housingand [https://perma.cc/TE4Z-Q2Z5].
25. See Lisa A. Gennetian & Eldar Shafir, The Persistence of Poverty in the Context of
Financial Instability: A Behavioral Perspective, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 904, 910–
16 (2015).
26. See Elizabeth O. Ananat & Anna Gassman-Pines, Snapshot of the COVID Crisis
Impact on Working Families, ECONOFACT (Mar. 30, 2020), https://econofact.org/snapshot-ofthe-covid-crisis-impact-on-working-families [https://perma.cc/7R56-4BVW].
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with $600 per week in federal money.27 It authorized three rounds of direct
relief payments to Americans totaling up to $3200 for adults and up to $2700
for children.28 Further, Congress appropriated $46.5 billion for emergency
aid to help renters facing eviction.29 Last, but hardly least, in March 2021,
Congress temporarily made the Child Tax Credit fully refundable and raised
the credit to $3600 for children younger than age six and $3000 for those
between ages six and seventeen.30 In light of this legislation, half of these
benefits were paid out in monthly benefit checks of $300 per child under the
age of six and $250 per child between the ages of six and seventeen.31
The support delivered through these measures provided broad relief to
U.S. families. The one-year expansion of the Child Tax Credit was
particularly transformative for American households with children. The
monthly child-benefit payments reached 61 million children—roughly 84
percent of all U.S. children.32 Nearly 70 percent of moderate- and
low-income families who received checks reported that the payments made
them feel less economically stressed.33
The child-benefit checks were particularly transformative for poor
families. The Center on Poverty and Social Policy at Columbia University

27. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No.
116-136, § 2104, 134 Stat. 281, 318 (2020) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 9023). The
$600 per week CARES Act supplement ended in late July 2020. See id. Subsequent legislation
contained a $300 per week supplement until September 6, 2021, when the federal program
ended. See American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 2901, 135 Stat. 4, 49
(amending 45 U.S.C. § 352(a)(5)(A)); see also LEVIN, supra note 12.
28. In March 2020, the CARES Act provided payments of up to $1200 per adult and $500
per child under the age of seventeen. See CARES Act § 2201 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 6428). In December 2020, the COVID-related Tax Relief Act of 2020 paid up to an
additional $600 per person. See Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 203, 134 Stat. 1182, 1953 (amending
15 U.S.C. § 9023(e)). In March 2021, Congress authorized payment of up to an additional
$1400 per person. See American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9601, 135
Stat. 4, 138 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6428B). The payments were reduced for individuals
making more than $75,000 per year and married couples making more than $150,000 per year.
See id.
29. See COVID-related Tax Relief Act § 501 (appropriating $25 billion); American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021 §§ 3201–3202 (appropriating $21.55 billion); see also Emergency
Rental Assistance Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policyissues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/emergency-rentalassistance-program [https://perma.cc/7JFJ-KQFP] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022) (providing
information about the two Emergency Rental Assistance programs).
30. Full funding was available for individual parents with children and an adjusted gross
income of less than $75,000, less than $112,500 for heads of households, or less than $150,000
for a married couple filing jointly. See American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 § 9611.
31. See id.; see also The Child Tax Credit, THE WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/child-tax-credit/ [https://perma.cc/QT37-YQZ2] (last visited
Apr. 2, 2022).
32. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury and IRS Disburse Sixth Monthly
Child Tax Credit to Families of 61 Million Children (Dec. 15, 2021),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0533 [https://perma.cc/TV4H-SVJD].
33. See Casey Parks, Most Parents Use Child Tax Credit on Food, Bills and Other
Necessities, Survey Finds, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2021, 2:15 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/11/18/child-tax-credit-spent-on-bills/
[https://perma.cc/W4TH-BZLY].

2022] COVID-19 & THE PERILS OF FREE-MARKET PARENTING 2515
found that the first payment in July 2021 lifted 3 million children out of
poverty, representing a 25 percent cut in the monthly child poverty rate.34
After the second payment, the number of households with children who did
not have enough to eat fell by one-third, or nearly 3.3 million, based on U.S.
Census Bureau data.35 The Center on Poverty and Social Policy at Columbia
University projected that, in the course of the year during which the Child
Tax Credit was expanded, child poverty would be cut by more than half, with
particularly large reductions for Black, Hispanic, and Native American
children.36 The number of children living in deep poverty would also be cut
by almost half.37 The significance of a 48 percent reduction of child poverty
within one year to the well-being of U.S. children is, as the Brookings
Institution put it, “hard to overstate.”38
II. U.S. FREE-MARKET FAMILY POLICY
The economic dislocations resulting from the pandemic hit U.S. families
particularly hard because the country has long relied on a market-focused
approach to family support that I call “free-market family policy.” This
policy is based on the view that families do better when they get what they
need privately through markets.39 According to free-market family policy,
the government’s role is not to support children directly but rather simply to
ensure strong markets, which will in turn supposedly benefit families.40 If
markets are strong, this theory posits, then every family will get a big enough
slice of the pie to privately satisfy its needs.41
Under free-market family policy, U.S. government programs provide
considerably less public support to families than do other countries’
programs. Before the pandemic, the United States was one of the few

34. See ZACHARY PAROLIN ET AL., CTR. ON POVERTY & SOC. POL’Y, MONTHLY POVERTY
RATES AMONG CHILDREN AFTER THE EXPANSION OF THE CHILD TAX CREDIT 1 (2021),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5743308460b5e922a25a6dc7/t/612014f2e6deed08adb
03e18/1629492468260/Monthly-Poverty-with-CTC-July-CPSP-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3N9K-LAJY].
35. See Claire Zippel, After Child Tax Credit Payments Begin, Many More Families Have
Enough to Eat, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Aug. 30, 2021, 12:00 PM),
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/after-child-tax-credit-payments-begin-many-more-families-haveenough-to-eat [https://perma.cc/4439-BKTJ].
36. See CTR. ON POVERTY & SOC. POL’Y, A POVERTY REDUCTION ANALYSIS OF THE
AMERICAN
FAMILY
ACT
1
(2021),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
5743308460b5e922a25a6dc7/t/600f2123fdfa730101a4426a/1611604260458/PovertyReduction-Analysis-American-Family-Act-CPSP-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/774H-492W].
37. See id. at 2.
38. Christopher Pulliam & Richard V. Reeves, New Child Tax Credit Could Slash Poverty
Now and Boost Social Mobility Later, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 11, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/03/11/new-child-tax-credit-could-slashpoverty-now-and-boost-social-mobility-later/ [https://perma.cc/27K5-PDNU].
39. See EICHNER, supra note 1, at 19; GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF
WELFARE CAPITALISM 26–27, 41–44 (1990).
40. See EICHNER, supra note 1, at 19.
41. See id.
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wealthy countries that failed to provide routine child-benefit checks.42 The
United States is also the only wealthy country that fails to provide any paid
parental leave whatsoever.43 Recently, a few states have sought to fill this
gap by passing their own paid leave laws—an important advance, despite
providing far shorter leaves than provided by other wealthy countries.44
In keeping with free-market family policy, even U.S. safety-net programs
do not fill the gap in ensuring that children receive adequate material support.
In every state but Wisconsin, the eligibility rules for Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) require that a family’s income fall below the
poverty line to be eligible.45 Of these, a majority of states require income
below half the amount of the poverty line, most of these requiring income
below 30 percent of the poverty line, even to be eligible for benefits.46
Further, under federal law, every state must set a lifetime TANF cap for
families of five years or less;47 some states have set the cap at as few as
twelve months.48 Roughly a third of states also cap or reduce TANF benefits
on the birth of a new child if the family was receiving benefits when the child
was born.49 The result of TANF’s restrictions and exclusions is that only
twenty-one in one hundred poor families nationally receive benefits.50 And

42. See, e.g., Dylan Matthews, Sweden Pays Parents for Having Kids—It Reaps Huge
Benefits. Why Doesn’t the U.S.?, VOX (May 23, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/
2016/5/23/11440638/child-benefit-child-allowance [https://perma.cc/EH57-934X].
43. See Ellen Francis et al., How Does the U.S. Compare to Other Countries on Paid
Parental Leave? Americans Get 0 Weeks. Estonians Get More than 80., WASH. POST
(Nov. 11, 2021, 11:08 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/11/11/global-paidparental-leave-us/ [https://perma.cc/BH85-CH7T].
44. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 245–249 (West 2022) (six weeks); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 32-502 (West 2022) (sixteen weeks); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-39.3 (West 2021) (thirteen
weeks); N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 380-2.4 (McKinney 2020) (eight weeks); 28 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 28-48-2 (West 2022) (four weeks); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50A.15.020 (West
2022) (twelve weeks).
45. See GENE FALK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43634, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY
FAMILIES (TANF): ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT AMOUNTS IN STATE TANF CASH ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS 3, 4 fig.1 (2014), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R43634.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU5H6VAS].
46. See id.
47. See GENE FALK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44668, THE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR
NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) BLOCK GRANT:
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 15 (2021),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44668.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3RU-LJSW].
48. See Mary Jo Pitzl, Arizona Limits Poverty Aid to 1 Year; Strictest in U.S., AZCENTRAL
(July 1, 2016, 10:40 AM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2016/07/
01/arizona-limits-poverty-aid-1-year-strictest-us/86499262/ [https://perma.cc/F82S-LKWX].
49. See ELISSA COHEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMINISTRATION OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES WELFARE RULES DATABOOK: STATE TANF POLICIES AS OF JULY
2015, at 158, 183–84 (2016), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/welfare-rulesdatabook-state-tanf-policies-july-2015
[https://perma.cc/G23H-GQEQ];
ELIZABETH
LOWER-BASCH & STEPHANIE SCHMIT, CTR. FOR L. & SOC. POL’Y, TANF AND THE FIRST YEAR
OF LIFE: MAKING A DIFFERENCE AT A PIVOTAL MOMENT 1, 12 (2015), https://www.clasp.org/
sites/default/files/public/resources-and-publications/body/TANF-and-the-First-Year-ofLife_Making-a-Difference-at-a-Pivotal-Moment.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MY3-R9HA].
50. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR
NEEDY FAMILIES 6 (2021), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-2210tanf2.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAU9-VRDD].

2022] COVID-19 & THE PERILS OF FREE-MARKET PARENTING 2517
the few families declared eligible for benefits will receive little help: in
two-thirds of states, their benefits will not raise them to even a third of the
poverty line.51 Moreover, despite the steep rise in rents across much of the
country, the United States’ housing subsidy programs are vastly underfunded
and waiting lists are generally extremely long.52
Most of the minimal public support U.S. families receive comes in the
form of tax benefits. Pre-pandemic, the Child Tax Credit gave most U.S.
families a yearly tax credit of up to $1000 (tax reform in 2017 temporarily
raised this amount to $2000 in exchange for elimination of the dependency
exemption).53
Because it was not fully refundable, however, the
lowest-earning families—including 27 million children—could not get the
full benefit of the credit.54 The Earned Income Tax Credit, while specifically
aimed at low-income families, is geared toward incentivizing work rather
than toward ensuring children’s support. Low-income families in which a
parent works accordingly receive a refundable tax credit that pays out at most
the amount at which a minimum-wage worker would earn in a year, and the
credit then provides a decreasing subsidy as the worker earns more above
that amount.55 But the program does not provide any benefits to the poorest
American children whose parents do not have earned income.56
Free-market family policy stands in stark contrast to the model of the
government’s relationship to families that most other wealthy, industrialized
countries have adopted, which I will call “pro-family policy.” Pro-family
policy considers the market to be an important tool for ensuring that families
get the resources they need to thrive, but it does not expect that the market
on its own can give families the economic security they need to do their
best.57 It therefore supplements private funding with a stream of public
51. See Lower-Basch & Schmit, supra note 49, at 6.
52. See NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE LONG WAIT FOR A HOME (2016),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/HousingSpotlight_6-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PP36GXRQ]; see also Policy Basics: Federal Rental Assistance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (Jan. 11, 2022), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/federal-rental-assistance
[https://perma.cc/H7VF-9PY8].
53. See 26 U.S.C. § 24(h)(2).
54. See Chuck Marr et al., Congress Should Adopt American Families Plan’s Permanent
Expansions of Child Tax Credit and EITC, Make Additional Provisions Permanent, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 24, 2021), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federaltax/congress-should-adopt-american-families-plans-permanent-expansions-of-child
[https://perma.cc/NP9C-3V88]. Only $1400 of the Child Tax Credit’s temporary increase to
$2000 annually, passed in 2017, is fully refundable to parents with insufficient earnings to get
the full benefit of the tax credit. See id.; GROVER (RUSS) WHITEHURST, ECON. STUD. AT
BROOKINGS, WILL TAX REFORM PROVIDE MORE SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES?
FOLLOW THE MONEY (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/
follow-the-money-report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP4K-TD7W].
55. See 26 U.S.C. § 32; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX GUIDE
2021:
FOR INDIVIDUALS 104–08 (2021), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8CS9-EYP8]; CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: THE
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 4 (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
policybasics-eitc.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3VJ-ABAZ].
56. See 26 U.S.C. § 32; WHITEHURST, supra note 54, at 5.
57. See EICHNER, supra note 1, at 20–23.
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funding to families.58 The idea is to construct systems that ensure families
get what they need before any damage is done to vulnerable people, like
children. Accordingly, long before the pandemic, pro-family policy
countries delivered monthly or quarterly child-benefit checks to families with
young children.59 These benefits are intended to make sure that children’s
material needs are consistently met, accounting for the fact that parents’
market earnings can sometimes be inconsistent and inadequate.60 This
stream of public funding is meant to ensure that all children have a “floor” of
economic support even when parents hit hard economic times; at other times,
the “ceiling” of children’s economic support is increased beyond what their
parents alone could pay.61
The distinctions I make between free-market and pro-family policy are
between ideal types; no country is a perfect exemplar of either of these
policies. However, the United States is certainly the country with policies
that most closely resemble the free-market ideal, although somewhat less so
if the temporary measures taken during the pandemic are considered.
Meanwhile, Finland is one of the countries that comes closest to the
pro-family ideal. Finnish parents receive a government check each month
following the birth of their first child and slightly more for each additional
child (so that the total check for a family with two kids is more than double
the check for a family with just one child).62 Further, Finland has other
programs that give parents cash.63 The government gives families about a
year’s publicly paid parental leave that can be split between parents, paid at
about two-thirds of their usual salary.64 Families who need still more
financial help can fall back on Finland’s safety-net programs, which include
a generous housing subsidy.65
Figure 1 below demonstrates the difference between pro-family and
free-market policies on public spending for children in graphic detail.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 20–21.
61. Id.
62. Amount and Payment of the Child Benefit, KELA, https://www.kela.fi/web/en/childbenefit-amount-and-payment [https://perma.cc/HCV7-UDGN] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
63. See id.
64. Finland offers three types of parental subsidies for new parents that can be
cumulatively
combined.
KELA,
FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN
8–13
(2021),
https://www.kela.fi/documents/12099/37345256/Families-with-children-brochure-Kela.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2ZSD-Y98Z]. Maternity allowance is available up to eight weeks before the
expected due date and lasts until the child is three months old. Id. Parental allowance becomes
available when the child is three months old and can be collected for approximately six months
(158 weekdays). Id. Fathers receive paternity allowance for a total of nine weeks throughout
the first two years of the child’s life. Id.
65. Id. at 4 (“Other Kela benefits that may be relevant to families include housing benefits,
financial aid for students, benefits for conscripts, unemployment benefits, and benefits related
to sickness and incapacity.”). Finland offers a general housing allowance, covering up to 80
percent of housing costs for low-income families. See KELA, GENERAL HOUSING ALLOWANCE:
BRIEFLY AND IN PLAIN LANGUAGE 9–14 (2021), https://www.kela.fi/documents/12099/
37345190/General-housing-allowance-brochure-Kela.pdf/3bb1dcb3-abc8-4ae8-b651fe0422ea6dbf [https://perma.cc/R2UA-36XE].
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Overall, the average level of Finland’s public spending on family benefits
per child between the ages of zero and five in 2015—including spending on
family programs like parental leave, child benefits, daycare, and tax
expenditures—clustered somewhere around $10,000 per year, calculated in
purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted dollars.66 Most of that amount was
for cash benefits in the first year, transitioning to large amounts spent for
childcare after that.67 In contrast, the average level of U.S. public spending
per child—much of it from tax breaks—was far lower.68 U.S. public
spending bumped up a little when kids reach ages three and four because of
the limited amount of public funds spent on childcare programs like Head
Start and prekindergarten at these ages.69 It bumped up still more when
children reach kindergarten at age five because our public spending on
education kicks in.70 But by that age, it is often too late for kids to make up
for what they did not get in earlier years.
Figure 1: 2015 Public Spending on Children by Age (Finland and the
United States)71

66. Many thanks to Fernando Filgueira for his insights here and in the next paragraphs.
See MERIKE BLOFIELD & FERNANDO FILGUEIRA, FATHERS, FAMILIES, AND THE STATE IN THE
WESTERN WORLD: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND POLITICAL RESPONSES (forthcoming); see
also GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN ET AL., WHY WE NEED A NEW WELFARE STATE 51 (2002);
Merike Blofield et al., The Pluralization of Families, in 3 INT’L PANEL ON SOC. PROGRESS,
RETHINKING SOCIETY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON
SOCIAL PROGRESS 677 (2018).
67. See PF1.6 Public Spending by Age of Children, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. (2015),
https://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm [https://perma.cc/55AR-XB98].
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. The graphs use the 2017 “PF1.6 Public spending by age of children” dataset from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development family database. Id. Spending

2520

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

Americans do not pay any less to support their well-being than do citizens
of other countries. In fact, overall, Americans spend significantly more on
overall well-being than people in most countries when both public and
private spending, as well as spending on health care, are factored in.72
Americans just spend most of this money privately as consumers—paying it
directly to doctors, hospitals, preschools, colleges, and private pension
plans.73 In contrast, citizens of countries with bigger public programs pay
more taxes to the government, which then spends it directly on goods and
services or through child-benefit checks.74
III. WHY U.S. FREE-MARKET FAMILY POLICY FAILED TO MEET
CHILDREN’S NEEDS EVEN BEFORE THE PANDEMIC
Free-market family policy leaves parents subject to market forces when it
comes to ensuring that children get the material support they need to do their

includes tax breaks for families with children; cash transfers (child benefits); paid maternity,
paternity, and parental leaves; daycare and prekindergarten; and education.
72. See GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE INCOMPLETE REVOLUTION: ADAPTING TO
WOMEN’S NEW ROLES 105, 108–09 (2009); Social Expenditure—Aggregated Data, ORG. FOR
ECON. COOP. & DEV., https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG
[https://perma.cc/532S-85VZ] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
73. See Social Expenditure—Aggregated Data, supra note 72.
74. In fact, when private spending and public spending on social welfare goods in the
United States are added together, the total (29.6 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP)
in 2017) was significantly higher than what most other countries spend. See id. Meanwhile,
Finland spent 24.5 percent of its GDP on well-being, and Denmark spent 25.2 percent of its
GDP on the same. See id. Recognizing that welfare states must be characterized not only by
how much is spent publicly, but also in terms of private spending on welfare goods, was a key
insight of Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s groundbreaking work. See ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note
39, at 103–04; ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 72, at 108–09.
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best. It should be no surprise then that, during the pandemic, the significant
market dislocations threatened devastation to children. Yet, as this next
section shows, well before the pandemic (beginning in the 1970s and
continuing through later decades) two macroeconomic changes—in the form
of dramatic rises in economic inequality and insecurity—occurred. These
changes made it difficult, and in many cases impossible, for U.S. parents to
meet their children’s needs privately.
A. America’s Skyrocketing Economic Inequality
Between 1973 and 2015, even as earnings among the top fifth of workers
skyrocketed, the hourly wages of the two-thirds of men without college
degrees dropped 18 percent in real dollars.75 Further, the drop in the real
value of the minimum wage during these decades and the large increase in
the number of low-wage service jobs in the U.S. economy mean that far more
jobs do not pay nearly enough to support a family. Almost a third of those
in the workforce today make less than $12 an hour, and few in these
low-wage jobs receive benefits.76 Many of these workers have children, and
no matter how hard or long they work, they simply will not earn enough to
get their kids what they need to do their best.77
To be sure, real household income grew even in the bottom fifth of
households during these decades.78 Yet this growth toward the bottom of the
economic ladder largely came from two factors. First, women’s hours of
paid work increased considerably during this time, resulting in families
working many more hours than they did in the past.79 Second, Medicare and
Social Security benefits rose for middle- and low-income senior citizens.80
75. See Ariel Binder & John Bound, The Declining Labor Market Prospects of
Less-Educated Men, J. ECON. PERSPS., Spring 2019, at 163, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC7745920/ [https://perma.cc/AKX9-MX3J] (wages for men ages 25–54).
76. See ECON. POL’Y INST. & OXFAM AM., FEW REWARDS: AN AGENDA TO GIVE
AMERICA’S WORKING POOR A RAISE 4–5, 12 (2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/oxfamus/www/static/media/files/Few_Rewards_Report_2016_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/MH67HCHW].
77. See Why the U.S. Needs a $15 Minimum Wage: How the Raise the Wage Act Would
Benefit U.S. Workers and Their Families, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.epi.org/publication/why-america-needs-a-15-minimum-wage/ [https://perma.cc/
VCV5-QXMA] (“More than a quarter (28%) [of minimum wage] workers have children. . . .
Today, in all areas across the United States, a single adult without children needs at least
$31,200—what a full-time worker making $15 an hour earns annually—to achieve a modest
but adequate standard of living.”).
78. See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 21–25
(2010); see also Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962 to
2016: Has Middle Class Wealth Recovered? 13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 24,085, 2017), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24085/w24085.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SN8S-7CLR].
79. This was a key finding of Elizabeth Warren’s best seller, The Two-Income Trap.
ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY
MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTS ARE GOING BROKE (2003); see also LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE
STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 36–38, 123–26 (12th ed. 2012).
80. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 79, at 123–26.
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Neither of these shifts, though, is much help for families raising children. At
least one parent almost always must cut back on paid work when a child is
born, which decreases the extra cash a second working parent provides. And
insofar as both parents remain in paid jobs, the family will generally have to
pay the high cost of daycare.81 Further, very few of these families will
benefit from the increased Medicare and Social Security benefits of the past
few decades since they are usually paid to families further along in life than
families with young children.82
Disparities in families’ wealth have also mushroomed in the last five
decades. Today, families in just the top 1 percent hold roughly twice as much
wealth as those in the entire bottom 90 percent.83 To make matters worse,
the drop in net worth of households headed by adults younger than
thirty-five—the families most likely to have young kids—has been
particularly steep. In 1984, the median net worth of these younger
households was $11,500; in 2009, it was $3500.84 Some of this drop comes
from the decreased real wages for men without college degrees and for
employees in entry-level jobs.85 The ballooning of two types of costs in
recent decades—housing and college86—also plays a major role in the drop
in net worth. Buying or renting a house and attending college are milestones
in life that are often associated with responsible adulthood. Attaining them,
however, is far more expensive than in the past and often depletes families’

81. See LYNDA LAUGHLIN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MATERNITY LEAVE AND EMPLOYMENT
PATTERNS OF FIRST-TIME MOTHERS: 1961–2008, at 19 (2011), https://www2.census.gov/
library/publications/2011/demo/p70-128.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VS5-SWBC]; WARREN &
TYAGI, supra note 79, at 38–39.
82. Medicare generally provides benefits only to those who are sixty-five years old or
older. See MEDICARE, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2022), https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10043.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2KBR-E4BA]. Social Security generally provides benefits only to those
who are sixty-two years old or older. See RETIREMENT BENEFITS, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2022),
https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10035.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6JY-NAH9]. The average
age of first-time mothers is twenty-six, and the average age of first-time fathers is thirty-one.
See Quoctrung Bui & Claire Cain Miller, The Age That Women Have Babies: How a Gap
Divides America, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2018/08/04/upshot/up-birth-age-gap.html [https://perma.cc/9VKU-DDBB].
83. See Wolff, supra note 78, at 9; see also CONG. BUDGET OFF., TRENDS IN FAMILY
WEALTH, 1987 TO 2013, at 1 (2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress2015-2016/reports/51846-familywealth.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8KB-HPRM]; Jesse Bricker
et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of
Consumer Finances, 103 FED. RSRV. BULL. 1, 10 (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
publications/files/scf17.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF8R-MJ7J].
84. See RICHARD FRY ET AL., PEW RSCH. CTR., THE OLD PROSPER RELATIVE TO THE
YOUNG:
THE RISING AGE GAP IN ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 1 (2011), http://
www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2011/11/WealthReportFINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4AHH-ZVRM] (2010 dollars).
85. See DAVID AUTOR & MELANIE WASSERMAN, THIRD WAY, WAYWARD SONS: THE
EMERGING GENDER GAP IN LABOR MARKETS AND EDUCATION 12 fig.2 (2013),
https://economics.mit.edu/files/8754 [https://perma.cc/Z8PF-Y8FL]; MISHEL ET AL., supra
note 79.
86. See FRY ET AL., supra note 84, at 2.
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assets for two decades or longer, a period during which most will have young
kids they must also support.87
This decrease in wealth, even before the pandemic, makes it tough to
impossible for most young families to get their children off to a good start.
The $3500 in wealth that the average young household has is often tied up in
a house or a car. But, even if it were liquid and available, it would be almost
completely depleted by the $3400 average out-of-pocket fees that hospitals
charge for a baby’s delivery—and that’s the cost for parents with health
insurance.88 That means most parents will have to scramble even to buy
basics like diapers, formula, and baby food.
The economic situation is even tougher for Black and Hispanic families.
The income gap between the median Black and white household has lingered
at about 60 percent for decades.89 That is partly because—for workers at
every level of education and during both boom and bust economies—
unemployment rates have remained roughly two times higher for Black
workers than for white workers since 1970.90 And, even when Black workers
find jobs, they are paid far less than white workers because fewer Black
parents can afford the high cost of college (publicly paid in most other
countries) and because of the United States’ persistent racism.91 The median
87. See id. at 4 (describing how housing costs diminish younger households’ wealth);
ROBERT HILTONSMITH, DEMOS, AT WHAT COST?: HOW STUDENT DEBT REDUCES LIFETIME
WEALTH 10 (2013), https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/AtWhatCost.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JB44-JZJT] (finding that student loan debt reduces lifetime net assets by
$207,690 on average).
88. EUGENE R. DECLERCQ ET AL., CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION, LISTENING TO MOTHERS III:
NEW MOTHERS SPEAK OUT 46 (2013), https://www.nationalpartnership.org/ourwork/resources/health-care/maternity/listening-to-mothers-iii-new-mothers-speak-out2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ6W-TWVA].
89. See MARY C. DALY ET AL., FED. RSRV. BANK OF S.F., DISAPPOINTING FACTS ABOUT
THE BLACK-WHITE WAGE GAP 2–3 (2017), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/
el2017-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP4S-Y3VW]; see also Valerie Wilson, Racial Disparities in
Income and Poverty Remain Largely Unchanged amid Strong Income Growth in 2019, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (Sept. 16, 2020, 10:49 AM), https://www.epi.org/blog/racial-disparities-inincome-and-poverty-remain-largely-unchanged-amid-strong-income-growth-in-2019/
[https://perma.cc/NJ33-K5KL] (showing that, in 2019, the median Black household earned 61
percent of what the median white household earned).
90. Robert W. Fairlie & William A. Sundstrom, The Emergence, Persistence, and Recent
Widening of the Racial Unemployment Gap, 52 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 252, 255 (1999);
Drew Desilver, Black Unemployment Rate Is Consistently Twice That of Whites, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/08/21/through-goodtimes-and-bad-black-unemployment-is-consistently-double-that-of-whites/
[https://perma.cc/SZ8U-6B48].
91. See DALY ET AL., supra note 89, at 3; VALERIE WILSON & WILLIAM M. RODGERS III,
ECON. POL’Y INST., BLACK-WHITE WAGE GAPS EXPAND WITH RISING WAGE INEQUALITY 3
(2016), https://files.epi.org/pdf/101972.pdf [https://perma.cc/696S-W4NG]; Tomaz Cajner et
al., Racial Gaps in Labor Market Outcomes in the Last Four Decades and over the Business
Cycle 23 (Fed. Rsrv. Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Ser. 2017-071, 2017),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017071pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NJ8BHD8]; see also Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?: A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,
94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 1011 (2004); Valerie Wilson, Black Unemployment Is Significantly
Higher than White Unemployment Regardless of Educational Attainment, ECON. POL’Y INST.
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Hispanic household, meanwhile, earns only 74 percent of what the median
white household earns.92
Families headed by single mothers must also deal with the gender wage
gap. Women, as a group, make 82 cents for every dollar men make.93 For
Black women, that figure drops to 62 cents.94 While Finland increases
child-benefit checks for single-parent families to ensure that they can
dependably support their children,95 such subsidies are anathema to U.S.
free-market family policy.
B. Economic Insecurity
The other economic trend undercutting parents’ ability to provide for their
children is the steep rise in economic insecurity in the past five decades.
Much of this increased insecurity comes from private companies offloading
risks they once assumed onto American workers and their families.96
Employers who need work done are more likely to hire temporary employees
or independent contractors than in the past, and they are more likely to lay
workers off when business is slow, leading to fewer workers having steady,
full-time jobs with benefits.97 Employers also moved to scheduling systems
that shift employee staffing based on customer demand, which maximize
employer profits at the cost of erratic paychecks for employees.98 Companies
are also less likely to provide health insurance than in the past, and when they
do, they are more likely to pass on more costs.99 The result is that one serious
(Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/black-unemployment-educationalattainment/ [https://perma.cc/TV9K-HL3U].
92. See Wilson, supra note 89.
93. See Robin Bleiweis, Quick Facts About the Gender Wage Gap, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2020/
03/24/482141/quick-facts-gender-wage-gap/ [https://perma.cc/JWT8-DAPU].
94. Id.
95. See Amount and Payment of the Child Benefit, supra note 62.
96. See generally JACOB HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN
JOBS, FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE, AND RETIREMENT AND HOW YOU CAN FIGHT BACK (2006).
97. See id. at 68–69, 71; see also JONATHAN MORDUCH & RACHEL SCHNEIDER, U.S. FIN.
DIARIES, SPIKES AND DIPS: HOW INCOME UNCERTAINTY AFFECTS HOUSEHOLDS 3 (2013),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53d008ede4b0833aa2ab2eb9/t/53d6e12ae4b0907fe7be
df6f/1410469662568/issue1-spikes.pdf
[https://perma.cc/363J-5PTK];
U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS, EARNINGS AND
BENEFITS 15–16 (2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669899.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TFW9-X6MC]; Lawrence Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work
Arrangements in the United States, 1995–2015 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 22,667, 2016), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22667/w22667.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z4WN-7VM6]; Press Release, NPR, Contract Jobs Are the New Normal:
NPR/Marist Poll (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.npr.org/about-npr/579672112/contract-jobsare-the-new-normal-npr-marist-poll [https://perma.cc/G62K-BV9P].
98. See LONNIE GOLDEN, ECON. POL’Y INST., IRREGULAR WORK SCHEDULING AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 1 (2015), https://files.epi.org/pdf/82524.pdf [https://perma.cc/JPK7-N2WT];
MORDUCH & SCHNEIDER, supra note 97, at 3.
99. See GARY CLAXTON ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RSCH. & EDUC.
TR., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2017 ANNUAL SURVEY 8, 106 (2017), https://files.kff.org/
attachment/Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-Annual-Survey-2017
[https://perma.cc/
3WRX-RTSL]; MISHEL ET AL., supra note 79, at 200 tbl.4.10; CATHY SCHOEN ET AL.,
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illness or significant chronic medical condition can destroy a family’s
budget.100
Among all Americans, more than one-third—roughly 98 million people—
were officially poor for at least two months between 2009 and 2012.101 And
many who do not fall below the poverty line are just one emergency away
from that fate. In 2017, four in ten Americans reported that they would not
be able to cover an unexpected expense of $400.102 Even hourly workers
with middle-class incomes commonly have shifts in income of 30 percent per
month.103 Families of color bear the brunt of this insecurity: nearly
two-thirds of Black families and half of Hispanic families live in a household
with moderate or high levels of economic insecurity.104 These increases in
inequality and insecurity mean that far fewer families can reliably support
children on their own today than families could five decades ago.
C. The Effects of Free-Market Policy in the Unequal and Insecure
Pre-Pandemic Economy
Increases in inequality and insecurity meant that, even before the
pandemic, far fewer U.S. children received the consistent material support
they needed to do their best than did children who lived under pro-family
policy. Comparing how many children got the resources they needed in each
regime depends on exactly where we set the bar for the level of resources that
children should receive. One reasonable place to set it is at the amount of
COMMONWEALTH FUND, STATE TRENDS IN THE COST OF EMPLOYER HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE, 2003–2013, at 4, 6 (2015), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/
files/documents/___media_files_publications_issue_brief_2015_jan_1798_schoen_state_tre
nds_2003_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HRK-EV4X].
100. See Melissa Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Financial Fragility, Medical Problems and the
Bankruptcy System, in WORKING AND LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF ECONOMIC FRAGILITY 53, 56–
61 (Marion Crain & Michael Sherraden eds., 2014).
101. See JONATHAN MORDUCH & RACHEL SCHNEIDER, THE FINANCIAL DIARIES: HOW
AMERICAN FAMILIES COPE IN A WORLD OF UNCERTAINTY 159 (2017); Dynamics of Economic
Well-Being: Poverty, 2009–2012: Table 3: People in Poverty 2 or More Months by Selected
Characteristics: 2009 to 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), https://www.census.gov/data/
tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/poverty-dynamics-09-12.html
[https://perma.cc/
973Q-HYSL].
102. See FED. RSRV. BD., DIV. OF CONSUMER & CMTY. AFFS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC
WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2017, at 21 (2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
publications/files/2017-report-economic-well-being-us-households-201805.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FR9U-CJ8A].
103. See Patricia Cohen, Steady Jobs, with Pay and Hours That Are Anything But, N.Y.
TIMES (May 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/business/economy/volatileincome-economy-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/G3A7-BLPG].
104. See ROBERT P. JONES ET AL., PUB. RELIGION RSCH. INST., ECONOMIC INSECURITY,
RISING INEQUALITY, AND DOUBTS ABOUT THE FUTURE: FINDINGS FROM THE 2014 AMERICAN
VALUES SURVEY 11 (2014), https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/PRRI-AVSwith-Transparancy-Edits.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PXZ-U57C]; see also JACOB HACKER ET AL.,
ECON. SEC. INDEX, ROCKEFELLER FOUND., STANDING ON SHAKY GROUND:
AMERICANS’
EXPERIENCE
ECONOMIC
INSECURITY
21–22
(2010),
WITH
http://www.economicsecurityindex.org/upload/media/ESI%20report%20final_12%2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VN95-VMV8]; Jacob Hacker, Understanding Economic Insecurity: The
Downward Spiral of the Middle Class, CMTYS. & BANKING, Fall 2011, at 25, 27.
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money that it costs for a family to meet their basic expenses like food, rent,
utilities, childcare, medical care, and transportation. Research suggests that,
on average, U.S. families need an income equal to at least two times the
federal poverty threshold to meet these needs.105 Yet, even set at this low
point—which fails to account for cash for families to pay for recreational
items like toys and games—in 2019, 38 percent of American children still
did not clear this bar.106 By comparison, a 2013 UNICEF study that set a
slightly higher bar for calculating what children should receive (it included
basic recreational items like bicycles and roller skates) concluded that only
2.5 percent of Finnish children were raised in households that could not meet
that standard.107 Put simply, almost none of Finland’s children failed to have
their basic needs met for lack of sufficient cash, compared to more than
one-third of U.S. children.
Setting the standard at the lower bar of simply avoiding poverty, the U.S.
system closes the gap somewhat with Finland, but not by much. Before the
pandemic, a 2017 comparative study concluded that the United States had by
far the highest rate of young children living in relative poverty (the poverty
standard that adjusts for the nation’s wealth) of the wealthy countries that
were compared: 21 percent. Finland’s rate, by contrast, was 4 percent.108
Under free-market family policy, nearly half of U.S. single-mother
families—46 percent—were determined poor, compared with 12 percent of
single-mother families in Finland.109 And U.S. families headed by Black,
Hispanic, and Native American women are disproportionately likely to be
poor.110 Even when comparing poverty rates based on an absolute poverty
standard (a standard that defines deprivation without taking the wealth of the
country into account), the United States still fared poorly, dropping to a 14
percent poverty rate for young children, compared to Finland’s 2 percent.111
105. See KINSEY ALDEN DINAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILD. IN POVERTY, BUDGETING FOR
BASIC NEEDS: A STRUGGLE FOR WORKING FAMILIES (2009), https://www.nccp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/03/text_858.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9Z5-N6UW]; SARAH FASS, NAT’L
CTR. FOR CHILD. IN POVERTY, MEASURING INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
(2009), https://www.nccp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/text_876.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2LAS-X25J].
106. See Children Below 200 Percent Poverty by Race in the United States, ANNIE E.
CASEY FOUND.: KIDS COUNT DATA CTR., https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/6726children-below-200-percent-poverty-by-race [https://perma.cc/TH95-ML3B] (last visited
Apr. 2, 2022).
107. See UNICEF, CHILD WELL-BEING IN RICH COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 9
fig.1.2a (2013), https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/rc11_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UWY5-EZWM]; see also UNICEF, MEASURING CHILD POVERTY: NEW LEAGUE TABLES OF
CHILD POVERTY IN THE WORLD’S RICH COUNTRIES 2, 10 fig.1a (2012), https://www.unicefirc.org/publications/pdf/rc10_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/PU4N-8RPH].
108. See Janet C. Gornick & Emily Nell, Children, Poverty, and Public Policy: A
Cross-National Perspective 11 tbl.2 (Lux. Income Study, Working Paper No. 701, 2017),
http://www.lisdatacenter.org/wps/liswps/701.pdf [https://perma.cc/57L4-DHGY].
109. See id. at 13 tbl.3.
110. See AMANDA FINS, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., NATIONAL SNAPSHOT: POVERTY AMONG
WOMEN & FAMILIES 1–2 (2020), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/
PovertySnapshot2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XJH-JT3Y].
111. See Gornick & Nell, supra note 108, at 18 tbl.1.
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And, since these poverty rates are based on annual income, both the absolute
and relative poverty rates radically underestimate the proportion of children
who are not receiving the material support they need. The families of a full
four-in-ten children fell below the U.S. federal poverty threshold for at least
two months of the year.112 Unfortunately, even temporary shifts in income
are associated with significant declines in children’s well-being over time.113
In sum, even before COVID-19, Finland’s pro-family policy system did a
much better job of ensuring that children received a consistent stream of
necessary material support than the United States’ free-market policy did. In
fact, Finland’s family support policies work so well that children’s relative
and absolute poverty rates are actually lower than the country’s relative and
absolute poverty rates for all persons.114 U.S. children’s poverty rates under
both measures are significantly higher than the general population’s.115 Long
before the pandemic produced such wide-scale harm that Congress threw a
temporary life preserver to American families, free-market family policy was
failing a high proportion of the nation’s children.
IV. U.S. FAMILY POLICY POST-PANDEMIC
Countries that supplement parents’ income with public funds to support
children tend to improve children’s well-being for several reasons described
below. All these reasons justify enacting permanent public support for U.S.
families that will remain in effect even though the economic upheaval from
the pandemic’s onset has now subsided.
First, because of workers’ upward earning trajectories during the course of
their lives, most families have more private money to spend later in their life
than at the time it could have best served their children’s development. The
U.S. system increases the skewing of wealth toward later in life still further
because the nation’s largest public spending programs, Social Security and
Medicare, funnel public funds to citizens at the end of their lives, but there
are no comparable spending programs at the beginning of life.116 As a result,
in 2019, the U.S. government spent about 9 percent of the federal budget on
the 22 percent of Americans eighteen and younger; meanwhile, the
government spent 45 percent of the federal budget on the 15 percent who are
elderly.117 In contrast, public spending on family policies would shift money
forward in U.S. families’ life cycles so they could spend it when it would
112. ASHLEY EDWARDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING:
POVERTY 2009–2011, at 64 (2014), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2014/
demographics/p70-137.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZQ2-UQ2Q].
113. See generally Nat’l Inst. of Child Health & Hum. Dev. Early Child Care Rsch.
Network, Duration and Developmental Timing of Poverty and Children’s Cognitive and
Social Development from Birth Through Third Grade, 76 CHILD DEV. 795 (2005).
114. See Gornick & Nell, supra note 108, at 18 tbl.1.
115. See id.
116. See JULIA B. ISAACS ET AL., URBAN INST., KIDS’ SHARE, 2018: REPORT ON FEDERAL
EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN IN 2017 AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS 32 (2018),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98725/kids_share_2018_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2M7K-SDS2].
117. See id. at 24.
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most benefit their children. Second, greater public outlays generally help
equalize spending among children, whereas private spending tends to
increase spending disparities. To take one example, for a U.S. child born in
2015, low-income families are likely to spend $212,300 to raise that child
through age seventeen.118 Higher-income families will spend more than
double that—about $454,770.119 Add a private college degree, and that
figure grows by close to another $200,000.120 But more equitable spending
on children results in significantly higher social welfare payoffs overall. The
same amount of money that well-off parents spend on a child’s participation
on a travel sports team would increase well-being far more if it were used to
pay for a high-quality preschool tuition that a family could not otherwise
afford.121
Third, systems that provide a stream of public funding deliver necessary
resources to children more consistently. One necessary feature of capitalism
is that it must be able to respond to market signals, including decreasing work
hours or laying workers off when demand softens. That means that the
income stream that comes in from private wages will, in many instances, be
insecure. Adopting more generous public funding for U.S. families would
therefore serve an income “smoothing” function that cushions children
during periods in which a family’s private income sources are reduced or cut
off. Children would therefore always have the floor of material support they
need to develop well.
CONCLUSION
The chances that the United States will move toward routine public
funding for children on a permanent basis have dimmed considerably during
the time this Essay has been in production. President Joe Biden’s Build Back
Better measure, which would have implemented important supports, is now
stalled in Congress, and its passage seems increasingly unlikely.122 What is
absolutely clear, however, is that the lives of U.S. children would have been
significantly improved by its passage. Concomitantly, its failure means that
the nation will continue to squander the well-being of its next generation.

118. See MARK LINO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY
FAMILIES: 2015, at 19 (2017), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/10700/blog-files/USDA_
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